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ALL VICTIMS MATTER
RECONCILIATION OF BALKAN FAITHS AND PEOPLES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF RECENT PROGRESS
By Vjekoslav Perica

Vjekoslav Perica is a Croatian-American historian, author of, among other things, Balkan Idols:
Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford University Press, 2002; Belgrade, 2006). His
most recent publication is “Serbian Jerusalem: Inventing a Holy Land in Europe’s Periphery, 19822019,” Chapter IX, in Nadim N. Rouhana and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, eds. When Politics
Are Sacralized: Comparative Perspectives on Religious Claims and Nationalism (Cambridge
University Press, 2020). Perica holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Minnesota Twin
Cities, USA. In the 1970s in former Yugoslavia he was a basketball player, and before the war, a
jurist and journalist until coming to America in 1991. As a US academic he was, among other
things, first Peace Scholar in residence at the United States Institute of Peace, lecturer at several
universities, and Fulbright scholar in Belgrade, Serbia. In 2012 he held a research fellowship at
the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS).
Since 2006, Perica has been a Professor of History at the University of Rijeka, Croatia, from which
he has recently retired. Perica regularly contributes to Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern
Europe (OPREE) and western Balkan regional internet magazines Pescanik, Tacno and XXZ. He
lives in Baltimore, Maryland, and on the Dalmatian isle of Solta, Croatia. In between, he spends
time with grandsons and their pets in New York City.

Introduction
In the last two years, religious and secular elites in Serbia and Croatia have exchanged
more kind words than ever since the fall of Yugoslavia. Even though those involved are all
ideological ethno-nationalists, it seems that moderates have prevailed over zealots. The far right,
however, did not cease its hateful propaganda and mythmaking. Nevertheless, interethnic fights
and incidents in public have subsided, and earlier common angry disputes at elite level
discontinued. From January 2019 to November 2020, the wartime enemies have sought
rapprochement through joint commemorations for all innocent victims of recent and earlier wars.
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PHASE ONE: ESTRANGED BROTHERS
Religious Leaders’ Initiative
Croatian Catholicism and the Serbian Orthodox Church opened the reconciliation process
early in 2019 and the secular elites followed suit in the second half of 2020. On January 17, 2019,
seventeen bishops, representing the Croatian branch of the Catholic Church and the Serbian
Orthodox Church, convened at the Catholic diocesan seat of Požega in northern Croatia. After two
days of ecumenical prayers and worship at the occasion of the annual Octave of Prayer for
Christian Unity (also joined by Protestants), leaders of the two major Balkan churches appeared
together before the media and released the following statement:
We remember the grave suffering of the Serb and Croatian peoples and other citizens of
Croatia during the recent past in wars, conflicts, persecutions, and killings, caused by
hatred. We are aware that by accusing each other, manipulating historical truth,
interpreting war events for daily political purposes, and continuing with mutual insults and
degradations only because of belonging to different faiths and nationalities, we will remain
captives of the past and losers in the present. . . . We deeply regret and honor every innocent
victim of any nationality, religious affiliation or political viewpoint from our recent past .
. . . Only by seeking mutual forgiveness we can rise above the evil that ashamed, diminished
and humiliated us. . . . Without vengeful thoughts and feelings of hatred, we keep the
memory of our innocent victims, we heal our wounded souls, promote trust and
understanding among individuals and nations and thus lay a solid foundation for a better
and more just future in our homeland for every human being. “1
The Požega declaration contains hopeful rhetoric behind which there is a good dose of
idealism. It was also pragmatic, addressing controversies from the recent past, namely the Balkan
wars of the 1990s. Although the statement could loosely apply to all historical periods, yet it
avoided to mention specifically the more complex legacies of the Second World War. Therefore,
conciliatory gatherings and pronouncements would address the major controversy, concerning
interethnic massacres and genocidal policies in World War II, that actually fueled the crisis leading
to the Serbo-Croat War in 1991.2
My translation from newsletter of the Serbian National Council of Croatia: “Biskupi i episkopi zajedno protiv podjela
i mržnje Novosti, 17. January 2019, https://www.portalnovosti.com/episkopi-i-biskupi-zajedno-protiv-nacionaln ih podjela-i-mrznje).
2 See among other titles of a massive literature, Tea Sindbaek, Usable History? Representations of Yugoslavia’s
Difficult Past from 1945 to 2002. (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press ), pp. 139-183; Mila Dragojevic, Amoral
Communities. Collective Crimes in Time of War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), pp. 94-100; Paul Mojzes,
Yugoslavian Inferno; Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans. (New York: Continuum, 1994), Balkan Genocides:
Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century.(Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Vjekoslav
1
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Despite this, the Požega declaration was definitely a historic document. Its pronounceme nts
and symbolic gestures of fraternity, with church leaders smiling to TV cameras, have started a new
postwar phase of rapprochement, 25 years after the major war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The tragedy involved Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) as both warring factions and
victims. In those wars, about 150,000 people lost their lives and several million were forcibly
resettled. Mass murder, torture, mass rape, bombardment, and destruction of places of worship and
civilian targets, cultural institutions and works of art were widespread. The United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, the Netherlands,
prosecuted the cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 3
After the war, the conflict continued, and hatred reigned. State and Church authorities
sponsored propaganda and mythmaking at the expense of objective research, scholarship, human
rights, and peace activism. Until recently in Croatia, for example, human rights groups and ethnic
minority Serb associations reported and document more than one hundred incidents annually
ethnically motivated violence: people were assaulted in the streets merely for wearing symbols of
a sports team or speaking in different accent. This occurred in addition to hateful chauvinist
chanting in sports arenas, the desecration of cemeteries, the destruction of memorials, ubiquito us
Ustasha, Nazi, and racist graffiti, and comparable forms of barbarism. In neighboring Serbia and
Bosnia & Herzegovina the situation was similar.
Similar meetings, pronouncements and commemorations followed the breakthrough at
Požega. In January 2019, Croatian Catholicism issued a rare pronouncement condemning the
Ustasha regime. At the national cathedral on January 27, speaking on the occasion of Holocaust
Remembrance Day, Cardinal Josip Bozanić, Archbishop of Zagreb, contextualized Ustashism as
the counterpart to Nazism and fascism. The Croat Ustasha carried out massive crimes of genocide
and ethnic cleansing against Serbs, Jews, and the Roma people, while also murdering thousands
of fellow Croats who opposed them; the Cardinal specifically condemned the Ustasha crimes in
the Holocaust that nearly annihilated Croatia’s Jewish community of thirty thousand people. The
Perica, Balkan Idols. Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), chaps.
9-10.
3 War crimes were committed by all warring factions, but among those sentenced, Serb military and political leaders
were the most numerous. Overall, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia sentenced 167 individuals for war crimes
including genocide and crimes against humanity. Owen Bowcott, “Yugoslavia Tribunal Closes, Leaving a Powerfu l
Legacy
of
War
Crimes
Justice.”
The
Guardian,
December
20,
2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/dec/20/former -yugoslavia-war-crimes-tribunal-leaves-powerful-legacymilosevic-karadzic-mladic.
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Cardinal said that the Ustasha who committed these crimes could not call themselves Christia ns.
He added: “Today on January 27, we commemorate the day of the liberation of Auschwitz. This
concentration camp is symbol of the suffering of six million Jews most of whom perished there.
This death camp and other Nazi-fascist camps throughout Europe, including the concentratio n
camp of Jasenovac and other such prison camps in Croatia, were mass execution sites of innocent
people. . ." 4
Another major event of what had by now evolved into a Balkan peace and reconcilia tio n
process took place on May 2, 2019, at the memorial site of the main Ustasha concentration camp,
Jasenovac, in northern Croatia. According to Radio Free Europe, “high representatives of four
religious communities--Jews, Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims--paid tribute to six million Jewish
victims of the Holocaust at a commemoration in the crypt of the Jasenovac monume nt,
condemning 'extreme ideologies,' and called for 'reconciliation, forgiveness, and turning to the
future.'”5 Representatives of all the four present religious communities also spoke at the Jasenovac
commemoration. Bishop Metropolitan Porfirije, of Zagreb-Ljubljana archdiocese of the Serbian
Orthodox Church, called for a “path of repentance and forgiveness” when visiting the place of
mass human suffering such as Jasenovac. Bishop Škvorčević added that no word of revenge,
manifestation of hatred, or manipulation of the number of victims is allowed at Jasenovac or
concerning it, but only “repentance, forgiveness, mercy, and reconciliation." Muslims from Croatia
also participated. Chairman of the Meshihat of the Islamic Community in Croatia, Aziz efendija
Hasanović, said: “God is just. We ask you to take away the sword from the oppressors and give
the weak the power of faith in truth and justice. Forgive us and teach us to forgive others. God, we
ask that sorrow be hope, and revenge be justice, that tears be a prayer that Jasenovac and no crime
of this world will ever happen to anyone again. . . ."6
The basis for these conciliatory activities has been long in preparation, perhaps since the
mid-1990s. It involved contacts among church diplomacies, appeals for peace and mitiga ting
historical controversies, contacts among benevolent church leaders and the papal visits to the

Mladen Pleše, “Božanič se jučer konačno odredio” Telegram.hr, 25.01.2019, https://www.telegram.hr/politika kriminal/bozanic-se-jucer-konacno-odredio-ljubitelji-ndh-ne-mogu-biti-krscani-ovo-je-analiza-n jegovog-vaznoggovora/.
5
“Katolici i pravoslavni zajedno u Jasneovcu,“ May 2, 2019,
Radio Free Europe, at
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/jasenovac-prastanje/29916904.html.
6 Ibid.
4
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region. It began with the Croatian Catholic bishop’s letter on the occasion of the 50th anniversar y
of the Second World War, which, for the first time, specifically expressed regret for losses and
suffering of the Serbian Orthodox Church at hands of the Croat nationalist regime in WW II:
Therefore, we will mention the victims of the Croatian people and the Catholic Church at
the holy altar. We will mention the victims of Serbian nationality and the Serbian Orthodox
Church in Croatia. We will mention Jewish victims, the Roma people, and all those killed
in our country in the Second World War only because they belong to different nationalities,
other confessional affiliations or other political beliefs. . . . The main difficulty is not how
to mourn the victims of one's own community but how to admit one’s guilt for the suffer ing
of another community. Croats and Serbs, Catholics and Orthodox, Muslims and others are
confronted with a more difficult moral question: How to mourn the victims of another
community, how to admit guilt in one's own community? And how to atone for guilt, how
to obtain the forgiveness of God and man, peace of conscience and reconciliation between
peoples and nations? How to start a new age based on justice and truth? 7
In a similar vein, Pope John Paul II’s homilies in Croatia 1994 and in Bosnia 1998
encourage seeking mutual forgiveness and reconciliation among the neighboring peoples of
Slavonic ancestry divided by religion which, in his words, also has the potential for healing and
reunification. During his first visit to then still-war torn Croatia, the Pope spoke not only of peace,
but also of fraternal reunification among the close ethnic relatives of western Balkans as a
historical reality and divine plan, suggesting that fratricidal wars here are an aberration from
history:
The present tragic divisions and tensions must not be the cause of the forgetting that many
elements unite the peoples at war today. And that is why it is urgent and necessary to gather
everything that unites--and this is not a small thing--and thus build new perspectives of
fraternal solidarity. Peace in the Balkans--I especially want to emphasize this in this
moment of suffering--is not a utopia! On the contrary, peace imposes itself as a perspective
of historical reality! The peoples of these lands of Europe have accepted each other over
the centuries; they have carried out many exchanges in the fields of art, language, script,
cultural, and national treasures. Is it not a commonwealth and tradition of religious
tolerance, which has been maintained through almost a millennium, even during very dark
periods of history? No, the phenomenon of nationalist intolerances that plague these parts
cannot be attributed to religion!
In these parts, put to such a test today, faith must once again become a force that unites
and bears good fruit, like the rivers that flow through these lands. Like the Sava, which
originates in Slovenia, it flows through your homeland, continues along the Croatian and
Bosnian-Herzegovinian borders, and in Serbia flows into the Danube. The Danube is
Branimir Pofuk, “Ove komemoracije bi trebale biti posvećene svim satrtim životima “Autograf, 05.27.202 0,
https://www.autograf.hr/komemoracije-bi-t rebale-b iti-posvecene-svim-satrtim-zivotima/.
7
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another large river that connects Croatian and Serbian land with large countries in
Eastern, Central, and Western Europe. These two rivers meet, just as the various peoples
they connect are invited to meet. This must be achieved especially by the two Christian
Churches, the Eastern and the Western, which have always lived together in these very
areas.
In that metaphor of rivers, we can almost notice the traces of the path that God is asking
you to tread in this difficult historical moment. It is a path of unity and peace that no one
should avoid. He is required by reason alone, even before faith. Has not history created
thousands of unbreakable bonds among your peoples? Your languages, although different,
are they not so close to each other that you understand and understand each other more
than is the case in other parts of Europe? The very geographical position of the Balkan
countries imposes itself as a peacebuilder because these countries are a mandatory
passage between the Middle East and Central Europe. That is why in the past centuries,
trade, exchange of various goods and entrepreneurship flourished here, all for the benefit
and well-being of all. The future of the Balkan Peninsula is in that perspective. In
cooperation and solidarity, the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula will be able to face and
solve many problems. The progress and good of the people in the Balkans have only one
name: "Peace!” 8
Pope Francis understands his papal predecessor’s passion about peace in the Balkans as
well as the Second Vatican Council’s Eastern ecumenism. In recent years, Pope Francis’ cordial
contacts with Serbian Patriarch Irinej (Gavrilović) exemplified for the bishops of the two churches
how to meet as friends and exchange views on issues and problems that concern both churches
and peoples. In a 2018 letter to the Patriarch of Serbia, Pope Francis exhorts: “For mutual meetings
and conversations, for striving for understanding, for building bridges in direct fraternal
communication, to which occasional meetings between individual bishops of the Serbian Orthodox
Church and bishops of the Catholic Church in Croatia also contribute. . . we should jointly testify
that forgiveness and reconciliation are the only way of liberation from the captivity of the past and
daily political interests. . . .”9
The Serb-Croat religious leaders’ rapprochement, in particular, has been also facilitated by
individual enthusiasm and friendship

among local bishops. Dr. Porfirije (Perić), Bishop

Metropolitan of Zagreb-Ljubljana labored to improve relations with the host Church and

“Holy Father’s Homily at the Hippodrome”, my translation from the Croatian Propovijed Svetoga Oca na
Hipodromu), September 11, 1994,” Archdiocese of Zagreb/Zagrebačka nadbiskupija, http://www.zg nadbiskupija.hr/govori-prigodom-prvog-pohoda-pape-ivana-pavla-ii-hrvatskoj-1994.
9 The Serbian Orthodox Church, Official Website/Srpska pravoslavna crkva, zvanični sajt, „Saopštenje za javnost“,
9. februar 2019, http://www.spc.rs/sr/saopshtenje_za_javnost_37.
8
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government in Croatia’s capital city. Together with cultural and political association of the Serbian
National Council, Bishop Porfirije worked to alleviate the animosity toward Serbs in Croatia.
Additionally, Dr. Anton Škvorčević of Požega and Bishop Jovan (Ćulibrk) od Pakrac led two
neighboring dioceses close to the two states’ border in which they initiated and managed
logistically the Požega meeting. Finally, Catholic Bishop Mate Uzinić of Dubrovnik and Orthodox
Bishop Grigorije of Herzegovina have become known as pioneers of postwar interfaith dialogue
and reconciliation.
Another factor that made the rapprochement possible was the prevalence of moderate and
pragmatic forces in the region’s politics. Of course, the consolidated ideology of ethnic nationalis m
mixed with religion has no alternative here yet. The extremists would prefer to make the war a
permanent condition, in contrast to the moderates, who seek a peaceful coexistence and
cooperation among neighbors as ethnic relatives. The liberalizing shift most notably occurred
within the governing ethnic nationalist party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) in the EUmember state of Croatia. Following his 2020 victory in parliamentary election, Croatian Prime
Minister Plenković, backed by the Vatican and the EU, purged his party of nationalist extremists
and marginalized the far right. Yet, he could not have succeeded without Serbs from Croatia as his
allies. By supporting HDZ moderates and Croatia’s left-wing governments, Croatian Serbs again,
as many times before in history, have proved their patriotic loyalty to Croatia as their homeland
rather than siding with pressures from Serbia that made many attempts at using them. When they
sided with Serbia they erred, such as most recently in the rebellion against Croatia in the 19911995 war, Croatian Serbs have more often backed Croat parties since the nineteenth century, even
when they struggled with Great Serbian nationalism. Without Croatia’s Serbs as allies, Croat
moderate nationalists would have never been able to resist nationalist challenges and pressures
from Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Serbia. That is why Ustasha genocide against Serbs in Croatia
and subsequent Croat nationalist attempts to vindicate the NDH (Independent State of Croatia-WW II Ustasha pro-Nazi state) were not just anti-Serb but also anti-Croat. Considering the recently
completed monument to the Holocaust in Croatia’s capital city, today's Zagreb also needs a
memorial to those victims among Serbs from Croatia who were killed by Croats, along with a
memorial to the joint Serb-Croat anti-fascist resistance in World War II, so that future generations
finally learn the origin of the brotherhood-unity slogan.
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After the 2020 shift in Croatian politics, similar trends followed in neighboring states.
Ethnic nationalist and religious parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina lost in recent local elections
while multiethnic, secular and liberal- left coalitions took power in the major cities. In Serbia,
which has remained the major nationalist fortress of the Balkans, President Aleksandar Vučić and
his regime were pressured toward liberalization and improving relations with neighboring coteries
by the EU as a way to keep Serbia on the candidate country track. The Vučić regime has long
struggled on the Kosovo front with no actual resolution in sight; the rapprochement with Croatia
would only improve Serbia’s international standing. Vučić also found the idea of a ritual SerbCroat reconciliation useful for redeeming his own extremist nationalist past: during the Serb-Croat
war of 1991-1995, when he was a member of a Chetnik paramilitary group. Vučić also noted the
favorable view on the reconciliation initiative in the Serbian Orthodox Church, an institution that
is generally a locomotive

of Serbian nationalism,

with occasionally pragmatic politics.

Accordingly, both the nationalist-populist Vučić and the paradigmatic religious- nationalist Serbian
Church have revived the old idea of a regional balance of power between the two largest ethnic
nations in the region, Serbs and Croats. The two peoples, close ethnic relatives and both majority
Christian nationalities, are imagined in Serb religious-nationalist myths as “estranged brothers,”
sometimes compared to the biblical Cain and Abel. Eventually, brothers will reconcile based on
mutual forgiveness and repentance of the guilty party. If both were guilty, they can pray for all
innocent victims. While the recently deceased Patriarch Irinej (Gavrilovic), during his ten years as
head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, had extensively commemorated Serb victims of Croat
fascism in World War II and its reverberation in contemporary Croat nationalism, he also
frequently spoke of the need for forgiveness, and Serbs and Croats as the two closest ethnic
relatives among European peoples. “Victims need remembrance,” the Patriarch pointed out on
several occasions,

and added, “yet,

commemorations

must

lead to forgiveness

and

reconciliation.”10
Accordingly, the ritual reconciliation between the two peoples and churches is partly
product of the nationalist narrative, and partly that of political agenda, states’ and churches’

Visit to Jasenovac: “Irinej: Mi, Srbi, nemamo bliže od Hrvata,” Vijesti, 24.
https://www.vijesti.me/svijet/balkan/139400/ irinej-mi-srbi-nemamo-blizih -od-hrvata
10
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interests. There are precedents for ideal of ethnic brotherhood as well as a Serb-Croat realpolitik
have been on the table earlier in history.

Secular Authorities Getting Involved
A new momentum in the process of the commemorations dedicated to all innocent victims
of wars, has followed in the second half of 2020. This time, secular authorities stepped in. Croatia’s
Prime Minister Andrej Plenković played a key role, assisted by President Zoran Milanović and the
Serbian National Council of Croatia. President of Serbia Alexandar Vučić also participated, aided
by Belgrade journalist and peace activist Veran Matić, who served as the Serbian president’s
special representative for missing persons. The task was left-over from previous peace missio ns
and reconciliation attempts undertaken by liberal Presidents Tadić of Serbia and Josipović of
Croatia. Prime Minister Plenković prioritized the interethnic cooperation and reconcilia tio n
agenda following the 2020 landslide electoral victory for the long-reigning nationalist party
Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). A moderate Catholic conservative from the isle of Hvar,
trusted by the Croat episcopate and the Vatican and favored by the leaders of the European Union,
Mr. Plenković isolated Croatia’s nationalistic far right while designing the mainstream party as a
European mainstream conservative party, a Balkan version of the Christian Democrats. The liberal
turn in Croatia has continued with the corresponding election of Zoran Milanović, a social
democrat, as president.
Thanks to the cooperation with the Serbian National Council in Croatia, Croatian Prime
Minister Andrej Plenković put his new politics on display on the occasion once exploited by radical
nationalists. Mr. Plenković succeeded in changing the triumphalist tone and nationalist-populist
contents of the annual victory parade in Knin. The event had for thirty years glorified the militar ypolice operation "Storm" of Summer 1995, after which the war ended with Serbian rebels’
surrender to the Croatian Army. The fall of the rebel Serb republic in Croatia also created a refugee
crisis for some 200,000 ethnic Serbs, natives of Croatia who had to flee and have mostly not
returned. Many resettled in Serbia which used them as a propaganda tool to pressure Croatia by
characterizing the events as a repetition of WWII Ustasha genocide. The Patriarch of Serbia led
annual commemorations of the Serb 1995 exodus, connecting it with Ustasha genocide in World
War II. The Patriarch described Serbs as greatest collective martyrs of humankind, their hardship
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comparable only to the fates of Jews and Armenians. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church
added that Serbs are prepared to forgive Croats but will never forget. 11 The President of Serbia
Vučić emphasized that Serbia has a strong military that will prevent future Croatian assaults on
the Serb minority.12 President of Serbia also blamed what he calls Croat postwar “triumphalis m”
as one of chief obstacles for a postwar reconciliation. There will be in the ensuing paragraphs a
few additional notes on the issue of triumphalism as one of the major obstacles to reconcilia tio n
and normalization of interethnic relations. International observers and experts for Balkan affairs
emphasize triumphalism among the causes of the wars in the 1990s. The last U.S. ambassador to
Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman, observed in 1989 that the Serbian nationalist triumphalis m,
notably the journey of Prince Lazar’s relics and the mass gatherings of the 600th jubilee of the
Kosovo battle, was one of the major triggers of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. 13
"We should now pay due respect for every innocent victim, be it Croatian, Serbian or other
nationalities," Prime Minister Plenković pointed out in Knin in August 2020, recognizing the 25th
anniversary of the war’s end.

14

For the first time since operation "Storm," the high politica l

representative of the Croatian Serbs, the former Member of Parliament and President of the Serbian
National Council, and now one of the four Deputy Prime Ministers of the Croatian Governme nt,
Boris Milošević, also sat in the front row at the commemoration. His father took part in "Storm"
as a Croatian soldier, and his grandmother was killed in a Serbian village in the hinterland of
Šibenik a few weeks later by vengeful Croat militants.
Subsequently, on August 25, 2020, in the Serb village of Grubori near Knin, President
Zoran Milanović, along with Croatian Deputy Prime Ministers Tomo Medved and Boris
Milošević, took part in the commemoration for Serb civilian victims at end of the war. After the
Orthodox Church’s religious service and commemoration, President Milanović said: "The murder
of six innocent elderly villagers that occurred here at the end of the Homeland War is nothing but

“Patrijarh Irinej o oluji: Ovakvu golgotu doživeli su Jermeni, Jevreji i mi Srbi od Ustaša!” Srbija danas, August 4,
2016, https://www.srbijadanas.com/vesti/drustvo/patrijar-irinej-prastamo-sve-lose-sto-su-hrvati-uradili-srbima-al ine-zaboravljamo.
12 “Vučić: Oluja više neće biti.” Al Jazeera Balkans, August 4, 2016, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/vucic-olujavise-nece-biti.
13 Warren, Zimmermann. Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers -- America's Last Ambassador
Tells What Happened and Why. (New York: Times Books, 1996).
14 Plenković na obilježavanju 'Oluje': Pijetet nevinim hrvatskim i srpskim žrtvama, Aug. 5, 2020, RFE/RL,
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/hrvatska-oluja-zrtve/30767646.ht ml.
11
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horror and revenge that cannot be justified with whatever kind of justice."15 Another statesponsored commemoration was held on September 27, 2020, at Serb village of Varivode, where
similar kind of vengeful crimes against civilians took place. Prime Minister Andrej Plenković laid
a wreath at the monument to nine Serb civilians killed a month and a half after the Croatian
military-police operation, "Storm," in Varivode in the Šibenik hinterland in 1995. After the
Orthodox Church’s funeral service, the Croatian Prime Minister said: "As the Prime Minister of
Croatia, I deeply regret this, and on behalf of the Government I express my condolences to the
members of your families whose lives the Croatian state—unfortunately--failed to protect." 16
Addressing members of the Serb community in Croatia, Plenković added that he wanted to send a
message of reconciliation. This does not mean forgetting what happened in the war, including the
Serb rebellion incited from Serbia and Croat victory in a war of self-defense, but learning lessons
and forgiving and learning how to live in peace again.
A major breakthrough took place in November at an annual commemoration for the first
great battle of the Homeland War in 1991, which occurred in and around the city of Vukovar which
is near the border with Serbia. There, after a three-months-long battle, when the city fell to the
invading Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitaries, two hundred Croat prisoners of war, civilia ns
and hospital patients, were summarily executed by a firing squad. The new policy of reconcilia tio n
advanced by Prime Minister Plenković involved balancing the traditional parade charged with
nationalistic and vengeful sentiments (with a number of right-wing groups participating) and the
new policy of reconciliation. The Serb participation was crucial, led again by the Deputy Prime
Minister, Boris Milošević, but this time also joined by Mr. Matic, the special envoy of Serbia’s
President Mr. Vučić.
Boris Milošević said in a statement for Serbian National Council’s newsletter Novosti and
Croatian media as follows:
As a citizen of Croatian Serb nationality and as Deputy Prime Minister, I cannot find strong
enough words to express regret over what happened to Vukovar, because all Vukovar
graves speak louder than my every word . . . . I also regret the fact that after 30 years of the
“Hrvatski politički vrh na komemoraciji srpskim žrtvama u Gruborima”, RFE/RL, Aug. 25, 2020.
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30802438.html.
16 Plenković u Varivodama: Sućut za srpske žrtve koje hrvatska država nije zaštitila., 28. septembar/rujan, 2020,
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/plenkovi%C4%87-u-varivodama-su%C4%87ut-za-srpske-%C5%BErtve-ko jehrvatska-dr%C5%BEava-nije-uspjela-za%C5%A1t ititi/ 30862620.ht ml.
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Vukovar tragedy, many Vukovar men and women cannot find their peace. I can't find my
loved ones. I regret everything that the war has done to interpersonal and interethnic
relations in this city, a city that was once proud of the richness of its diversity. With my
arrival, I want to pay tribute to all the victims of Vukovar and send a message of
reconciliation, a message of tolerance and express a desire to establish a dialogue at the
local level. I believe that Croatia today, as a modern republic, democratic and European
country can and must find the strength and find ways to create preconditions for successful
healing of wounds of all city residents, citizens of all nationalities, as a pledge to build a
place of quality living and promising future. Eternal memory to the innocent victims of
Vukovar!17
Also, on this occasion, representatives of Croatian left-wing parties and human rights
associations held special commemorations in Vukovar for victims of the battle and subsequent
civilian and war prisoners’ suffering.

By throwing a wreath in the Danube, they also

commemorated Serb civilians who were tortured, shot, and thrown into the river near Vukovar.
Furthermore, the commemoration for the Croatian victims of Vukovar, organized by the "Women
in Black" in Belgrade, a well-known association for peace and human rights, was of special
importance. But it was the Serbian President’s representative, Veran Matić, who paid tribute with
the most spectacular move at Vukovar commemoration. Mr. Matić attended all commemoratio ns
yet, in Vukovar, he went a step further from just observing and paying tribute. Recalling the
historical precedent of Willy Brandt in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970, when the German Chancellor
fell to his knees (genuflectio or Kniefall), as a manifestation of German regret for Nazi crimes
against Jews, Veran Matić knelt at the monument to Croatian prisoners of war and civilians killed
by Serb force and Yugoslav People's Army after the fall of Vukovar. Mr. Matić explains his gesture
as follows:
Every visit to an execution site or reminder of anniversaries of wartime massacres creates
anxiety in me, which, I believe, stems from the strong empathy I feel towards the victims
and their families. In Questions of Guilt, Karl Jaspers, a book we published in Samizdat,
states, in addition to criminal responsibility, political guilt, moral guilt, and metaphysical
guilt, "There is solidarity among people as members of the human race that makes
everyone co-responsible for every guilt and injustice in the world, and especially for crimes
committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I don't do everything in my power to
prevent them, I'm partly to blame…" Maybe that's the closest definition of anxiety that
occurs. I did not get rid of it even when I knelt in front of the monument in Ovčara, but I
did something that created at least a small space to do much more, or to make gestures of
piety and pity and regret until the preconditions are made to take concrete steps toward

Boris Milošević: Empatija prema svim žrtvama pretpostavka je pomirenja, Novosti, Nov. 18, 2020,
https://www.portalnovosti.com/milosevic-postovanje-i-empatija-prema -svim-zrtvama-pretpostavka-su-pomirenja .
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resolving open issues and controversies, the most difficult of which are finding the missing
persons, exhumation, identification… 18
His gesture was welcomed by many in Serbia and Croatia. As expected, radical nationalists
of both nationalities attacked him and condemned his move: Serbians construed it as an insult to
Serb pride and betrayal of Serbia, while to Croatians it was an insufficient show of remorse by
Serbia. The problem, however, was not in Matić, whose move is only praiseworthy, but in
President Vučić, whom he represented. Aleksandar Vučić was personally involved in the Serbian
paramilitary formations led by indicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj during and after the battle for
Vukovar 1991. Vučić also used for his party propaganda the sentenced war criminal, Veselin
Šljivančanin, the Yugoslav army commanding officer who ordered the executions in Vukovar.
Although Matić is not responsible for his president’s past actions and political convictions, he
received criticism from the Serbian left and human rights activists who hold that Matić anyhow
helped Vučić to redeem and rehabilitate himself although the ideal solution is that Vučić and
people like him leave government. Nevertheless, Mr. Matić’s genuflectio was sincere and a bold
move as recognized by many intellectuals in Serbia and Croatia. After all, regardless of who holds
the office, historians will have to note that the institution and the office of the President of Republic
of Serbia has actively participated in and helped the reconciliation effort.

PHASE TWO: A ROAD AHEAD
What seems to be a “phase one” of the Balkan peace and reconciliation process has been
initiated successfully, and that was largely a Christian and Serb-Croat affair. A massive unfinis hed
business awaits the peacemakers on the road to a lasting and just peace. If the momentum is to be
maintained, the remaining issues and challenges need to be approached and managed as soon as
possible. To begin with, the motto of “phase one” was honoring all from any religion, nationality
and political persuasion. Two categories of victims have not been honored as yet: Bosnian Muslims
as principal victims of Balkan wars in the 1990s, and the victims, members of Yugoslav antifasc ist
resistance in the Second World War whose commemoration was discontinued when the former
Yugoslavia collapsed. In addition, the task of facing and managing historical controversies cannot

Veran Matić, Zašto sam kleknuo pred spomenikom na Ovčari,”
https://www.autograf.hr/zasto-sam-kleknuo-pred-spomenikom-na-ovcari/.
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be bypassed. Historical revisionism, mythmaking and controversy have plagued this region for the
last four decades. While it is not possible to lift the burden of the past quickly, or entirely, the
formula tested in “phase one” in Croatia can be extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and
elsewhere. That is to say, coming together united to worship and commemorate at historical sites
of memory and suffering in order to honor all innocent victims of any nationality, religion, and
political idea. Afterward, together and united, these nations can condemn public incidents that
spread hatred.

Honoring Bosnian Muslim Victims
As noted earlier, the recent progress toward reconciliation in the Balkans has been mainly
a Catholic-Orthodox, i. e. a Serb-Croat affair. The third concerned party in the region, Bosnian
Muslims (or Bosniaks by national name), harbor mixed feelings about it. The highest religio us
authority for Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Reis Husein Kavazović, welcomed the inter-churc h
peace initiatives, but warned that building of a lasting and just peace in the region must also involve
Bosnian Muslims. Following the August 2020 commemoration in Knin, Reis Kavazović issued a
special statement to the media which combines conciliatory and warning overtones. In his words:
We are following the news about Serb-Croat reconciliation initiatives with joy and hope
for a brighter future in this area. We hope that all nations, as well as political and religious
leaders in the Balkans, have matured enough to turn a new page in the history of our
peoples. We also welcome the fact that the early voices of reconciliation come from Serbia
and Croatia, as the two largest nations of the former Yugoslavia. They are also most
responsible for everything that happened in the 1990s, especially in Bosnia and
Herzegovina . . . in the wars of the 1990s, Bosniaks were the ones who paid the highest
price, and both Croatia and Serbia, during four years of aggression, often by joint efforts,
tried to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina and annex its 'ethnically cleansed' territories to
their own nation states . . . . (Therefore) reconciliation will not be possible if it is not sincere
and if it excludes Bosnia and Herzegovina and its leaders and if it is not based on the
postulates of truth and justice, i.e. through the naming of the perpetrators. We assure our
neighbors, instructed by agreements and events from the recent and distant past that any
agreement that may harm Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot pass. Especially not at the
expense of those who are ready to die for their homeland, as many times before. . . . Today
Bosnia and Herzegovina has many friends around the world who will not allow peace in
the Balkans to be called into question. . .19
„Reis Kavazovic: 'Pomirba u regiji potrebna ali nije moguća bez BiH' (Aug. 11, 2020);
https://www.24sata.hr/news/reis -kavazovic-pomirba-u-regiji-potrebna-ali-n ije-moguca-bez-b ih-710581;
“Reis
Kavazović: Srpsko-hrvatsko pomirenje na štetu BiH neće proći,” BHRT, Aug. 11, 2020. https://bhrt.ba/reis-kavazovicsrpsko-hrvatsko-pomirenje-na-stetu-bih-nece-proci/.
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The commemorations with public regrets expressing respect for all innocent victims of
recent wars are especially important for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Something similar to the events
in Požega, Knin, Gurbori, Varivode, and Vukovar in Croatia is possible, necessary, and urgently
needed at places like Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Omarska, Ahmići, Mostar, and other sites of memory
and suffering of innocent victims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are obstacles, however, both
politically and logistically. The Serbian Orthodox Church is about to elect a new patriarch, so the
extension of the reconciliation process from Croatia to Bosnian-Herzegovina will depend on his
views on the reconciliation process. The most delicate yet important commemoration at Srebrenica
will probably have to wait, though an interfaith meeting at Sarajevo may be possible earlier.
Additionally, the Pope may be prepared for his second visit to Sarajevo and even to commemorate
in Srebrenica, and Croat bishops would likely follow. What the Serbian Patriarch and Serb bishops
will do is difficult to predict. A compromise may be possible in form of a joint interfa ith
commemoration for all victims, mentioning specifically Muslim victims, at Sarajevo, during the
expected papal visit. Attendance of religious and secular elites from Croatia and Serbia would be
essential.

MANAGING LEGACIES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Will the Pope Pray at Jasenovac?

The idea for the Pope and Serbian patriarch to lead an interchurch commemoration for
victims of Jasenovac concentration camp emerged during the Cold War and came to Yugosla via
in 1984. The Serbian Orthodox Church commemorated at Jasenovac as a counter-commemora tio n
to the massive gathering concluding Catholic Church’s jubilee “Thirteen Centuries of Christianity
of the Croat People.” At Jasenovac, the Serbian Patriarch spoke in a way that would resonate in
Croatia, with the message: “We must forgive but we will not forget.” The Catholic Church
interpreted this as a provocative gesture, part of the Serb nationalist collective strategy to inspire
guilt in the Croat people. The two Churches’ relations further worsened amidst the pre-war crisis.
A hypothetical yet instructive question is hard to evade: if the two major Balkan churches had
reconciled back then, only several years before the war, if the Pope had come and with the Serbian
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patriarch together prayed for the victims at Jasenovac, would the Balkan wars of the 1990s have
been averted?
The long-awaited papal visit to Serbia may happen in the next year or two and include the
mythical Catholic-Orthodox interfaith worship at Jasenovac. The popes after the Second Vatican
council and the renewal of diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia might have been willing to undertake
trip to Jasenovac, but Marshal Tito would not allow it as, in his view, it would be a nationalis tic
provocation. John Paul II would have likely gone to Jasenovac, but the situation in wartime and
early postwar was such that the Croat bishops would object. After the November commemora tio n
at Vukovar, however, a new opportunity arises. Logistically, two commemorations in one day at
two geographically adjacent locations seem feasible. A papal commemoration at Vukovar
(together with the Patriarch) would be possible as a stop upon his return from Jasenovac to
Belgrade. Thus, Veran Matić’s genuflectio at Vukovar might have paved the way for this major
historic achievement. A rigorous preparatory diplomacy is still needed, and the historic
opportunity has never been so apparent as now. In the meantime, Serbian Orthodox Church
authorities in Croatia are long overdue in honoring victims of Serb Chetnik massacres against
Croat civilians and Catholic clergy in World War II, such as in Dalmatia. Such a commemora tio n
would help preparations for the papal pilgrimage to Jasenovac.

The Stepinac Controversy
Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac was beatified in 1994. As his canonization neared, in 2016,
Serbian Patriarch Irinej wrote to Pope Francis asking for a delay. The Patriarch offered new
information to clarify Stepinac’s ties with the Ustasha regime in World War II, particular ly
concerning the crimes against the Serbian Orthodox Church and forcible conversions of Serb
Orthodox Christians to Roman Catholicism. The result was the freezing of the canonizatio n
process and the initiation of further research. Stepinac, like the Catholic Church in Europe (as
several church documents have admitted since 1998), did not help the victims as much as he could.
He also supported the pro-Nazi Croat satellite state as much as he could to the very end of the war
and was decorated by the Croat pro-Nazi regime. Stepinac, however, did oppose the communists
and was imprisoned, which earned him a beatification. The Stepinac case became a politica l
nationalist myth with multiple purposes: first as anti-communist myth sanctioned by the Church,
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and, after foundation of Tudjman’s Croatia, also by the state, which together uphold the myth to
inspire anti-communism in future generations; then, the narrative became a Croat nationalist
counter-myth against Serb nationalism, blaming the Catholic Church for inciting genocide and
portraying Croats as collectively guilty of massively supporting the Ustasha regime.
Internationally recognized research about the Ustasha state and its crimes was conducted
and this scholarship has been available to the Holy See. 20 If this literature did not stop the
beatification, neither will the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Besides, this Church itself
has done many canonizations according to political criteria. It has canonized so far 76 native Serbs
as saints, including almost all Serb rulers and kings, some of whom did not live saintly lives. 21
Concerning

specifically

Catholic-Orthodox

relations,

two recent

Serb saints,

Nikolaj

(Velimirović), canonized in 2003 and Justin (Popović) who was made saint in 2010, were both
vocal and published anti-ecumenical and anti-western theological writings. Finally, there has been
a vehement anti-Vatican campaign within Serbian nationalism, accusing the Holy See without
compelling evidence of allegedly inciting the Croat Ustasha to forcibly convert Serbs to
Catholicism and destroy Orthodox faith in the Balkans. When seeking a papal intervention to hold
the process for Stepinac’s canonization, Patriarch Irinej did not apologize for this anti-Catholic is m
and the political saint-making in his own church. Eventually, the Serbian Orthodox Church will
have to accept Cardinal Stepinac as a Christian saint based on his opposition to communism and
long suffering in communist jail and confinement. Although Stepinac did in fact support the
Ustasha regime, he was personally not involved in crimes and pro-Nazi collaboration, in contrast
to the Serb war criminals General Milan Nedić, head of the pro-Nazi government in Serbia, or
Serbian native clerical fascist Dimitrije Ljotić and leader of the Chetniks, Draža Mihaliović, all of
whom the Church of Serbia considers patriots and seeks to rehabilitate. Finally, Stepinac’s
sainthood alone should not make reconciliation between Serbs and Croats impossible. But, in order
to further improve relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Croat episcopate should
20

For example, Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration.
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001); Jozo Tomasevich, Chetniks, (Stanford University Press, 1975);
Rory Yeomans, Visions of Annihilation: the Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941-1945.
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013); Slavko Goldstein and Ivo Goldstein, Holocaust in Croatia;
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, published in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum, 2016); Jasenovac: tragika, mitomanija, istina. (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2016); Slavko Goldstein. 1941: the year
that keeps returning; translated from the Croatian by Michael Gable. (New York: New York Review Books, 2013).
21 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 75–76.
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discontinue support for historical revisionism. In particular, they should cease the annual
commemorations in Austria dedicated to the retreating NDH army captured by Yugoslav partisans
in 1945. Not only does the Serbian Church view it as glorifying the Ustashas as martyrs, but the
Church in Austria, the Vatican, and the Church in Croatia also disapprove of it.

Denigrating Yugoslav Antifascists’ Sacrifices
Only a few months before the Second World War’s end, on the outskirts of the port city of
Split, Croatia, German Nazis and their Croat Ustasha allies captured 22-year-old Palmina Piplović,
a young Croat woman who was a member of the Yugoslav antifascist resistance movement.
Palmina was on a mission as a liaison between the city resistance cell and Partisan guerillas in the
adjacent hills. After three days of brutal torture, Palmina was hanged on an electric pole along the
road to the city. It took her comrades several days to obtain and bury her body in a dignified
funeral. When Croat ethnic nationalists came to power in the 1990s, they renamed a kindergarte n
named after Palmina Piplović, under pretext that she fought for a totalitarian communist regime
and a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. This was recently contested by a Croatian writer, who wrote:
“That is not true, she was a Croat patriot and a true martyr, who, along tens of thousands of other
fallen heroes Croat antifascists, sacrificed life to liberate Croatia from foreign occupation and
redeem the Croats for the criminal Ustasha stigma.” Recently in Split a human rights group
initiated the return of Palmina Piplović’s name to the kindergarten and unveiled in the city a large
mural with her portrait.22
Indeed, the myth of Cardinal Stepinac’s martyrdom and his alleged resistance to “all
totalitarian regimes and ideologies” will not save the Croat’s face and redeem the Croats from their
association with the Ustasha and the collective guilt placed upon them by Serb nationalists. The
redeemers of the Croats are martyrs and heroes like Palmina Piplović and Croat antifascists.
Paradoxically, Croat nationalists' labor to erase Croat antifascism from memory plays into the
hands of Serb nationalism. Serbia and Croatia not only seek rehabilitation of individ ua l
collaborators and war criminals, but also entire regimes, such as the Nedić regime in Serbia and

Vedran Sršen, “Palmina čuva Hrvatsku”, Tacno.net, 10 November 2020, https://www.tacno.net/novosti/palminacuva-hrvatsku/.
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the NDH in Croatia, while the antifascist Partisans are portrayed as godless communists and worst
war criminals.23
The Yugoslav multiethnic antifascist movement was one of the most massive and
effective resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe in the Second World War. Yugoslav
Partisans fought a war against foreign invaders and an interethnic civil war against the Ustasha,
the Chetniks, and other domestic collaborators with the invaders, and liberated and reunified the
country as a federation of equal ethnic nations. The costs of their efforts were enormous: more
than 355,000 Partisan fighters died in combat, two-thirds of the pre-war membership of the
Communist party and the Communist youth had perished, and several hundred died under brutal
torture or heroically in battle (1,322 of these victims were awarded the "People's hero" honor
posthumously). Finally, about 1.5 million civilian victims were after the war identified by
international commissions as victims of fascist terror and invaders’ reprisals. International authors
would customarily write that most of those 1.5 million Yugoslavs (2 million if the combatants are
counted) were killed by other Yugoslavs, specifically the Croat Ustasha, Serb Chetniks, other
quisling militia, and the Partisans. It may be so, yet the foreign invaders, Nazis and fascists from
Germany, Austria, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania are responsible for killing, hanging,
torturing, and displacing hundreds of thousands Yugoslavs. Italian fascists and German Nazis in
particular are responsible for deliberately and systematically inciting genocide between Serbs and
Croats, although it has become later customary in some historical studies to ascribe it to the two
Balkan people’s “ancient ethnic and religious hatreds.” Credible authors and witnesses of history,
however, testify to the massive crimes and genocidal politics carried out by invading Germans,
Italians, and other collaborators domestic and foreign. 24 The Yugoslav Partisan antifascist epic
inspired massive cultural production, notably in literature, film, sculptures, and memoria ls,
paintings, and other works of art.
When in the 1990s ethnic and religious nationalists took power, they attempted to erase the
Yugoslav antifascist tradition from memory. Some do try to find ways of rehabilitating them
through historical revisionism. Authorities in the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina have
“Croatia’s WWII Revisionism ‘Terrifying’, Says Historian,” Interview with Rory Yeomans, Balkan Insight, 28
September, 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/09/28/croatia-s-wwii-revisionis m-terrifying-says-historian-09 -2 62016/; Srđan Milošević, “Rehabilitacija Nedića”, Pescanik , Belgrade, July 26 2018; https://pescanik.net/rehabilitacijanedica/.
24 Louis Adamic, My Native Land. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943); Milovan Djilas, Wartime. Translated by
Michael B. Petrovich. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977).
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recently

considered

building

a chapel and conducting

reburials

at the memorial

site

commemorating the battle of Sutjeska, the largest battle in the Balkans in the Second World War.
There, more than 8,000 Partisan fighters, including several hundred women in combat units, lost
their lives.25 They were buried together because they fought and died together: Serbs,
Montenegrins, Croats, Bosniaks, Slovenes, Jews, and others. The following is a commentary by a
senior Bosnian writer and journalist:
Today's rulers trade in human bones, destroying the elementary values of the antifascist
struggle. When the media reported last year that the authorities of the Republika Srpska
entity were building an Orthodox church in Tjentište for the Serb partisans killed in
Sutjeska, numerous protests followed. The construction of the church on that occasion on
that place, said many prominent anti-fascists, cannot be understood in any other way than
as an attempt to make the fight against fascism completely meaningless, with a flagrant
abuse of religious symbols. . . . For years, Sutjeska has been a gathering place for partisans
and anti-fascists from all parts of the former common state, so it is obvious that certain
political circles, supported by the church, are trying to somehow alienate the place from
those who inherit anti-fascist and partisan heritage. Many historians, even outside Bosnia
and Herzegovina, have placed the move in the context of trying to give the partisan
movement an exclusively Serbian prefix during World War II . . . . This dimension is even
more meaningless in Sutjeska, where partisans from all nations died together and literally
side by side. Sutjeska, from the point of view of the current Croatian government, is an
even bigger paradox. The parliament of that country is the patron of the anniversary of
Bleiburg, but Croatian institutions are not the patron of the anniversary of the battle in
which the youth of Dalmatia perished. There were 1,316 partisans from the city of Šibenik
and its surroundings on Sutjeska alone, and 787 were killed. Only from Split and its
surroundings, 1,091 partisans took part in that great battle, 688 of them were killed.
Instead, every mention of anti-fascism in Croatia regularly turns into a discussion about
"crimes of all totalitarian regimes", without anyone trying to explain what connections
Dalmatian partisans, who died on the Neretva, Sutjeska and other battlefields, have
nothing to do with any totalitarian regime. They perished in a collision with the greatest
evil in human history before they even experienced the creation of socialist Yugoslavia and
Tito's regime . . . .26
Yet, for nationalists and historical revisionists, there are also unintended consequences of
the suppression of the anti-fascist tradition. They are now facing internal divisions and collective
identity crises within the newly constructed post-Yugoslav ethic nations. Paradoxically, Serbia and
Croatia as sovereign nations conduct diplomacy aimed at reconciliation, while, at the same time,
each remains divided internally, along the World War II clashes between antifascists and ethnic
25

Ingrid Strobl. Partisanas: Women in the Armed Resistance to Fascism and German Occupation (1936 -1945).
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 1989).
26 Amir Sužanj, “Sutjeska – ogledalo apsurda ovdašnjih antifašizama“, Al Jazeera Balkans, June 7, 2020,
http://balkans.aljazeera.net/blog/sutjeska-ogledalo-apsurda-ovdasnjih-antifasizama.
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nationalists. So, why don’t the antifascist victims matter? Why would it be objectionable for
interethnic and interfaith ecumenical commemorations to be held at major sites or massive
antifascists’ human losses and suffering, such as, for example, Sutjeska, Neretva, or Kozara? If
sacrifice and victimhood of persons whose identities cannot be determined in exclusive
ethnoreligious terms are anyhow exempt, if these humans do not merit human empathy and tribute
as victims, the idea of honoring all victims (and thus purchase the moral capital for reconciliatio n)
is falling apart.

Why Did the Communists Omit Reconciliation after WW II?
According to official perspectives on World War II and the communist era in Balkan states
today, the victorious communists failed to carry out a necessary reconciliation after a bloody
interethnic civil war during World War II because they were atheists, immoral, brutal, and
vengeful. Their leader Marshal Tito is portrayed as a brutal dictator and charismatic authority,
enjoying a massive secular worship and new cult glorifying his heroic personality. Tito was
therefore the opposite of historical figures known for post-civil wars reconciliation policies such
as, say, Abraham Lincoln or Francisco Franco. To be sure, the Yugoslav communists were openly
and perhaps excessively triumphalist following their victory in the Second World War. This
triumphalism deepened their enemies’ hatred and determination to continue the struggle while also
inspiring envy in their allies, notably the Soviet Russians, which led to the Tito-Stalin split in 1948.
The temptations of an excessive triumphalism and revenge have affected many secular and
religious movements in history. It is generally considered harmful by moral philosophers,
theologians, as well as political scientists studying revolutions, no matter how justified it could
seem, due to the gravity of massive suffering and human losses.
Although the 1945-1953 period of the Yugoslav revolution was relatively the most
repressive in its history, the postwar Communist Party policies involved prosecution of wartime
enemies (though some major war criminals had, by this point, escaped), continuous struggle with
ethnic nationalist guerilla and terrorist groups, but also amnesty and reintegration. Concurrently,
commemorations dedicated to victims of war as well as jubilant celebrations of the victory were
almost daily occurrences. Marshal Tito and Yugoslav leaders came up with an official explanatio n
why no reconciliation among ethnic nations would be needed in the Yugoslav case. In short, the
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reason given was that the antifascist popular front unified all nationalities and faiths regardless of
the enemies’ effort to divide them. Their joint struggle forged brotherhood in arms that evolved
into the patriotic ideology of unity. This joint multiethnic struggle also redeemed their peoples
from the stigma caused by the ethnic nationalists’ genocidal crimes and the treasonous
collaboration with foreign invaders.
Following the Cominform affair and the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, a new category of victims
came from within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In order to prevent a coup or guerilla
uprising, the Tito regime imprisoned thousands of most devout communists, supporters of Stalin
against Tito, to a concentration camp Goli otok (Naked isle) in the north Adriatic. There they were
tortured and kept long years in this gulag. 27 Although some were rehabilitated and the Party later
labored to erase this ugly episode from its history, ethnic nationalists used these events to fuel their
conspiracy theories. Serbian nationalism used the fact that most of the prisoners were ethnic Serbs
and Montenegrins, known for their traditional love for Russia, to argue that they were especially
targeted to suffer at hands of a Croat of Catholic background (Tito), aided by the then his righthand man who was a Slovene (Edvard Kardelj). The truth is that those communists who sided
with Stalin against Tito were largely the most dogmatic and zealous world revolutionaries, though
some were innocent victims of the secret police’s abuses of power, career competition, intrigue,
and envy.28 Probably most of the 50,000 that suffered there were excessively punished for merely
expressing political views or were simply innocent victims of a repressive regime. Who will
commemorate those victims? Since the 1980s, Serbian nationalism has appropriated most of them,
characterizing them as innocent victims persecuted by communists of other nationalities merely
because of their ethnic origin. In sum, the idea of commemorating all innocent victims of all wars
and repressive regimes, including all nationalities, religions, and political convictions, appears as
the only solution in the case of Yugoslavia and its successor states whose, history generated so
much controversy that it cannot be completely resolved, thoroughly clarified, and accepted by all.
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Triumphalis m as an Obstacle to Reconciliation
As noted earlier, besides mythmaking and historical revisionism, triumphalism is one of
major obstacles for normalization of interethnic relations and reconciliation in the Balkans.
Triumphalism corresponds to the notorious “Balkan mentality” characterized by parochial
consciousness and tribal warrior ethos. As nations, they remain incomplete, especially in
comparison with the Tito era in the 1970s, the highest point of development. Inter-tribal envy led
to conflict and hindered the social development from tribal to national consciousness.
Triumphalism is today best seen in football stadiums through wild fans’ chanting: “We are
champions; kill and trample the opponent; let the envious suffer. We are world champions!” In a
modern secular society, it may be best that this energy is sublimated into sports, many in which
Yugoslavs were (and are, in many post-Yugoslav successor states) exceptionally successful (Land
of champions sings proclaiming “Magnifico”).29 But, such an attitude is counterproductive in
religion.
Historically, Serbia’s triumphalism after World War One gave way to Yugoslav
disillusionment. Tito's triumphalism after World War II fed into the excessive retaliation against
war opponents in 1945, angered Stalin, and led to the 1948 Cominform affair. Serbia likewise
caused anxiety and anger among neighboring peoples with the triumphalist Prince Lazar relics’
parade and the 600th Kosovo jubilee in 1989, whose battle cries led to the wars of the 1990s. The
Croat victory in the 1991-1995 Serb-Croat war angered Serbia. And triumphalism in Serbia, under
the nationalist President Vučić, caused conflict with the Croatian triumphalism of the 1995 war,
which celebrates the militarily superior offensive operation "Storm" and the expulsion of Serbs. It
was noted earlier that the Croatian Prime Minister Plenković took this complaint into account,
attempting to limit the Knin jubilee of triumphalism and turn it into a dignified celebration of the
end of the war and commemoration in honor of all innocent victims. The success of this
reconciliation, so that these rituals stop being a farce, requires the persuasiveness, modesty, and
true humility in leadership.
Triumphalism is a well-known phenomenon in religions. Israeli-American historia n
Richard Landes writes that “triumphalist religiosity, which makes claims to truth subject to
contests for dominion, is fundamentally hostile to the modern democratic project, this ongoing

29 Magnifico
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experiment in human freedom of speech and faith.” For Landes, “there is a close correlation
between triumphalist religiosity and tribal warrior, honor-shame culture;” he goes on to argue that
“culturally, triumphalism is at the intersection of two powerful social forces: a tribal warrior ethos
that appeals especially to the youth, and an imperial, millennial ethos that mobilizes the drive for
world conquest. . .”30
An American Catholic author wrote in 2015 as follows:
Religious triumphalism is the conviction that one’s religious beliefs are superior to other
people’s. Ironically, triumphalism violates the virtue of humility that is extolled by virtually
every religion. It is the theological equivalent of sports’ fans chanting “We’re number
one.” In sports the practice is innocuous, even somewhat charming. That is certainly not
the case in religion. Unfortunately, religious triumphalism is most common among the
staunchest religious believers. . . .31
Accordingly, the symbolic peacemaking in the Balkans can be enthusiastic without becoming
triumphalist. Further success will also depend on each group’s and leader’s abilities to avoid the
triumphalist, egocentric, and ethnocentric attitudes, theatrical gestures, and pomp. The participants
will hopefully show restraint, humility, sincerity, and, above all, respect for all innocent victims
of any nationality, ethnic and religious background, and political ideals for which they sacrificed
their lives. Last but not less important--as some religious leaders have pointed out--is that the
purpose of these commemorations is not only to foster remembrance, but to also encourage
forgiveness and reconciliation among the successor generations.

CONCLUSION: GIVE PEACE A CHANCE
A relative success of "Phase one" of the Balkan peace and reconciliation process was
initiated “from above” and remained largely a Serb-Croat “fraternal” affair, seeking to heal the
estrangement between two close ethnic relatives. Cooperation between the two peoples is also
made possible by church diplomacy, that is, a Catholic-Orthodox ecumenical rapprochement. In
order to advance, this initiative needs to be completed. The next major challenge will be the
anticipated papal visit to Serbia and the commemoration at Jasenovac, and then, in “phase two,”
Richard Landes, “Triumphalist Religiosity: The Unanticipated Problem of the 21st Century ,“ Tablet Magazine,
February 10, 2016, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/triumphalist-religiosity.
31 Vincent Ryan Ruggiero, „Overcoming Religious Triumphalism,“ Catholic Journal, December 18, 2015.
https://www.catholicjournal.us /2015/12/18/overcoming-religious-triu mphalism/.
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the expansion of these commemorations to Bosnia-Herzegovina, with inclusion of Bosniaks and
commemorations of Muslim suffering at key sites of memory such as Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
The achievements of the Balkan peace in 2019-2020 will yet face further tests and challenges. The
plan outlined earlier also needs to involve proper responses to possible challenges from the
clerical-nationalist far right. The success for the further commemorations, for example, at
Jasenovac and the expansion to Bosnia-Herzegovina, is probable. Yet the religious elites’
participation in the commemoration of the Yugoslav antifascist tradition is unlikely. The antifasc ist
tradition can count on commemorations through cultural, artistic, and scholarly production and by
progressive and left-wing politicians, leftist and liberal clergy, and the human rights, peace, and
historical associations. The official religious and government institutions will likely abstain and
some will continue with the historical revisionism. That is to say, all victims matter, provided they
can be identified in religious, national, or ethnic terms and appropriated by nation-states, politica l
or religious organizations. It seems that no idea, principle, ideal or set of memories can survive
unless protected by a state or by organized religion.
Overall, the recent progress toward reconciliation of the peoples and faiths in the Balkans
is good news. The moderates within ruling nationalists’ ranks marginalized the extremists
domestically and found support abroad, notably in the European Union, which is interested in
fostering greater stability in the troubled southeastern periphery, as well as from the Vatican, both
during the pontificate of John Paul II and under Pope Francis, with his ambitious ecumenica l
agenda concerning the Eastern Orthodox sister church. Serbia and Serb-Croat relations in western
Balkans seem particularly important to the Vatican, which has concurrently labored on improving
relations with Eastern Orthodox Churches in Romania and Bulgaria and in particular the CatholicOrthodox relations in the warring and unstable Ukraine.
Balkan wars of the 1990s brought to power vehement ethno-religious nationalisms. Their
war aims were to secure that every ethno-denomination establishes a state of its own, with a
religious

monopoly.

Those

nationalisms

emphasize

myth,

self-pity,

triumphalis m,

commemoration, and revisionist obsession with mythical history. The idea of reconciliation at
mass graves and sites of memory and suffering comes from the religious nationalist narratives and
discourses. Concurrently, after thirty years of the rule of such nationalism in this area, it has
become clear that instead of mastering the past based on objective research and accepting facts,
nationalists prefer to manage collective guilt and historical controversies by prayers, rituals, peace
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rhetoric, public apologies, and commemorations for all innocent victims. Nothing else could be
done insofar as the contesting interpretations of the past, counter-myths, and the negative
perceptions of the Other have been cemented into national identities and even consecrated by new
religious saintly cults. Regardless, the ritual reconciliation and commemorations dedicated to all
innocent victims of the conflict, which is now being increasingly perceived as a tragedy rather than
triumph, is not without its value and has been working well during the last two years. Therefore,
let's give peace a chance. Commemorations that acknowledge and honor all victims and call for
forgiveness and reconciliation of faiths and peoples, even though it may be only symbolic, will
help normalize and civilize these wounded societies.
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